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We prove the unconditional security of the Bennett 1992 protocol, by using a reduction to an
entanglement distillation protocol initiated by a local filtering process. The bit errors and the phase
errors are correlated after the filtering, and we can bound the amount of phase errors from the
observed bit errors by an estimation method involving nonorthogonal measurements. The angle
between the two states shows a trade-off between accuracy of the estimation and robustness to
noises.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.-a
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a way to
share a secret key between two parties (Alice and Bob)
with very small leak of information to an eavesdropper
(Eve). One of the simplest of such protocols is called
B92 [1], which is based on the transmission of only two
nonorthogonal states. For a qubit channel between Al-
ice and Bob, this protocol proceeds as follows. Alice
randomly chooses a bit value j, and prepare a qubit in
state |ϕj〉 ≡ β|0x〉 + (−1)jα|1x〉, where 0 < α < 1/
√
2,
β ≡ √1− α2, and {|0x〉, |1x〉} is a basis (X-basis) of
the qubit. She sends the qubit through the channel to
Bob, who performs a measurementMB92 with three out-
comes j′ = 0, 1, “null”. The measurement MB92 is de-
fined by the POVM F0 = |ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|/2, F1 = |ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|/2,
and Fnull = 1−F0−F1, where |ϕj〉 ≡ α|0x〉− (−1)jβ|1x〉
is the state orthogonal to |ϕj〉. When the outcome is
j′ = null, Bob announces that to Alice and they discard
the event. Otherwise, they take notes of their bit values
j and j′, which should coincide in the absence of channel
noises and Eve’s intervention. Repeating this procedure
many times, each of Alice and Bob obtains a sequence
of bits. Then they converts the sequences into a shared
secret key through public discussions.
Although the QKD protocols themselves are simple,
proving the unconditional security is quite hard, since
Eve may make a very complicated attack such as inter-
acting all of the transmitted qubits jointly to a big probe
system. This task has been accomplished [2] for the BB84
protocol [6], which involves four states forming two con-
jugate bases. Subsequent proofs [3, 4, 5] have provided
us more than a basic claim of security, including a beau-
tiful interplay [4, 5] between QKD and other important
protocols in quantum information, such as the entangle-
ment distillation protocol (EDP) [7] and the Calderbank-
Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error correcting codes [8].
It is natural to ask about the unconditional security of
the B92 protocol, which is conceptually the simplest of
the QKD protocols. In contrast to BB84, it involves a
free parameter α representing the nonorthogonality. The
analyses of the B92 protocol is hence expected to give
us an idea about how the nonorthogonality is related
to the ability to convey secret information. Since the
security proofs of BB84 rely on the symmetry of the
protocol which is not shared in B92, it is not a trivial
task to modify it for B92, except for the limiting case of
|〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 = 1/2 [9].
In this Letter, we give a proof of the unconditional
security of the B92 protocol for qubit channels, applicable
to any amount of nonorthogonality α. We show that
the B92 protocol is related to an EDP initiated by a
local filtering [10]. We also develop a method to estimate
an error rate by measuring randomly chosen samples on
a different basis, which plays an important role in the
proof.
We first introduce a protocol involving EDP, which is
then shown to be reduced to the B92 protocol. We as-
sume that Alice initially prepares a pair of qubits AB in
the state |Ψ〉AB = (|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A|ϕ1〉B) /
√
2, which
is nonmaximally entangled. Here Z-basis {|0z〉, |1z〉}
of a qubit is related to the X-basis by |jz〉 = [|0x〉 +
(−1)j|1x〉]/
√
2. Alice sends Bob the qubit B through a
quantum channel. Suppose that Bob performs a “local
filtering operation” on qubit B, described by the Her-
mitian operator Ffil ≡ α|0x〉B〈0x| + β|1x〉B〈1x|. When
the state of AB was ρ, the qubit B passes the filter-
ing with probability p = Tr[ρ(1A ⊗ Ffil)2], resulting
in the filtered state [(1A ⊗ Ffil)ρ(1A ⊗ Ffil)]/p. When
the channel is noiseless and Eve does nothing, this pro-
cess is just the Procrustean method mentioned in [11]:
the filtered state should be the maximally entangled
state (EPR state) |Φ+〉 = (|0x〉A|0x〉B+ |1x〉A|1x〉B)/
√
2,
since the initial state is also written as |Ψ〉AB =
β|0x〉A|0x〉B + α|1x〉A|1x〉B. When noises are present,
the filtered state may include a bit error, represented by
the subspace spanned by {|0z〉A|1z〉B, |1z〉A|0z〉B}, and
a phase error, represented by the subspace spanned by
{|0x〉A|1x〉B, |1x〉A|0x〉B}. In parallel to the protocols for
BB84 [4, 5], we can consider the following protocol that
will work under the presence of noises.
Protocol 1: (1) Alice creates 2N pairs in the state
|Ψ〉⊗2NAB , and she sends the second half of each pair to
Bob over a quantum channel. (2) By public discussion,
Alice and Bob randomly permute the position of 2N pairs
of qubits. (3) For the first N pairs (check pairs), Alice
2measures her halves on Z-basis, and Bob performs mea-
surementMB92 on his halves. By public discussion, they
determine the number nerr of errors in which Alice found
|0z〉 and Bob’s outcome was 1, or Alice found |1z〉 with
Bob’s outcome 0. (4) For the secondN pairs (data pairs),
Bob performs the filtering Ffil on each of his qubits, and
announces the total number nfil and the positions of the
qubits that have passed the filtering. (5) From nerr and
nfil, they estimate an upper bound for the number of bit
errors nbit, and an upper bound for the number of phase
errors nph, in the nfil pairs. If these bounds are too large,
they abort the protocol. (6) They run an EDP that can
produce nkey nearly perfect EPR pairs if the estimation
is correct. (7) Alice and Bob each measures the EPR
pairs in Z-basis to obtain a shared secret key.
For the same reason as in the proofs of BB84 [4, 5], if
the estimation in step (5) is correct except for a proba-
bility that becomes exponentially small as N increases,
the final shared key is essentially secure. Intuitively, this
comes from the fact that Eve has no clue on the outcomes
of a measurement performed on an EPR pair, since it is
in a pure state by definition. We will soon show how to
estimate the upper bounds for the errors in step (5). Be-
fore that, we will show that Protocol 1 can be reduced to
the B92 protocol.
According to the discussion by Shor and Preskill [5], we
can use a one-way EDP based on CSS codes in step (6).
Then, they have further shown that the whole extraction
process of the nkey-bit final secret key from the noisy
nfil pairs in steps (6) and (7) can be equivalently accom-
plished by Z-basis measurements directly performed on
Alice’s and Bob’s qubits of the nfil noisy pairs, followed
by a public discussion. Hence, without affecting the se-
curity, we can assume that Alice performs Z-basis mea-
surements immediately after she has prepared the state
|Ψ〉AB, and that Bob performs Z-basis measurements im-
mediately after he has performed the filtering. Protocol 1
is thus reduced to a prepare-and-measure protocol. Now,
note the following relation for j′ = 0, 1, which is easily
confirmed:
Ffil|j′z〉B〈j′z |Ffil = Fj′ . (1)
This implies that the filtering followed by the Z-basis
measurement is, as a whole, equivalent to the measure-
ment MB92. Hence in the reduced protocol Alice simply
sends |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 randomly, and Bob performs MB92
on all of the received qubits, which completes the reduc-
tion to B92.
The estimation in step (5) can be done as follows. The
number of bit errors nbit could be determined if Alice and
Bob exchange their measurement results in Z-basis. But
this is the same process as the one performed on the first
N pairs to obtain nerr, due to the relation (1). Thanks
to the random permutation in step (2), the check pairs
are regarded as a classical random sample from the 2N
pairs. Then, from a classical probability estimate, we
may assume
|nbit − nerr| ≤ Nǫ1. (2)
For any strategy by Eve, the probability of violating this
inequality is asymptotically less than exp(−Nǫ21).
The estimation of the phase errors is far more compli-
cated. To do this, we derive several inequalities by as-
suming gedanken measurements that are not really done
in the Protocol 1. The number of phase errors nph could
be determined if Alice and Bob measure the nfil pairs in
X-basis just after step (4). Since the filtering operator
Ffil is also diagonal in X-basis, nfil and nph could also be
determined by another measurement scheme, in which
Alice and Bob perform X-basis measurements first, and
then Bob applies the filtering Ffil. Note that this filtering
can be done classically by Bernoulli trials since the out-
comes of the X-basis measurements are available. This
new scheme also produces the numbers nij(i, j = 0, 1) of
pairs found in state |ix〉A|jx〉B. Since nij and nfil (nph)
are related by Bernoulli trials, we have
|α2(n00 + n10) + β2(n01 + n11)− nfil| ≤ Nǫ2 (3)
|α2n10 + β2n01 − nph| ≤ Nǫ3, (4)
which are violated with probability asymptotically less
than exp(−2Nǫ22) and exp(−2Nǫ23), respectively.
Next, recall the fact that neither the noisy channel nor
Eve can touch the qubits held by Alice. This implies that
the marginal state of Alice’s data qubits before the mea-
surements should be ρ⊗NA , where ρA ≡ TrB(|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ|) =
β2|0x〉A〈0x|+α2|1x〉A〈1x|. We can thus regard n10+n11
as a result of a Bernoulli trial, obtaining
|α2N − (n10 + n11)| ≤ Nǫ4 (5)
with probability of violation asymptotically less than
exp(−2Nǫ24).
Let us switch to the measurement on the check pairs
(the first N pairs). The element of POVM corresponding
to the error in step (3) is given by Πerr = (|Γ11〉〈Γ11| +
|Γ01〉〈Γ01|)/2, where |Γ11〉 ≡ α|0x〉A|0x〉B − β|1x〉A|1x〉B
and |Γ01〉 ≡ β|0x〉A|1x〉B − α|1x〉A|0x〉B. This is readily
derived from the relation |jz〉A|ϕj〉B = |Γ11〉−(−1)j |Γ01〉.
Let us add two more states, |Γ00〉 ≡ β|0x〉A|0x〉B +
α|1x〉A|1x〉B and |Γ10〉 ≡ α|0x〉A|1x〉B + β|1x〉A|0x〉B, to
form a basis. While nerr is determined from local mea-
surements in step 3, the same outcome could be obtained
by performing globally the complete measurement on ba-
sis {|Γij〉}, followed by a Bernoulli trial with probability
1/2. Letmij be the number of pairs found in |Γij〉. Then
we have
|(m11 +m01)/2− nerr| ≤ Nǫ5, (6)
which is violated with probability asymptotically less
than exp(−2Nǫ25).
3Since {|Γ01〉, |Γ10〉} and {|0x〉A|1x〉B, |1x〉A|0x〉B} span
the same subspace, we can relatem10+m01 and n10+n01
by the classical probability estimate as in Eq. (2):
|(m10 +m01)− (n10 + n01)| ≤ Nǫ6, (7)
which is violated with probability asymptotically less
than exp(−Nǫ26). We would like further to relate
m01/(m01 + m10) to n01/(n01 + n10), but we can no
longer apply classical arguments here, since |Γ01〉 and
|0x〉A|1x〉B are nonorthogonal. We will thus extend the
classical probability estimate to the quantum case in the
following.
The problem to be considered is as follows. M =
M0+M1 qubits are prepared in a state, and the position
of qubits are then randomly permuted. Then, each of
the first M0 qubits is measured on an orthogonal ba-
sis {|0, 0〉, |0, 1〉}, and the rest of M1 qubits are mea-
sured on another basis {|1, 0〉, |1, 1〉}. What we ask is
the bound for the probability p(δ0, δ1), with which M0δ0
qubits are found to be in |0, 1〉 andM1δ1 qubits are found
to be in |1, 1〉. Let ρ be the state after the permuta-
tion, and |χ〉 ≡ ⊗b,j |b, j〉⊗nb,j , where nb,1 = Mbδb and
nb,0 = Mb(1− δb). Then, the probability is given by
p(δ0, δ1) = 〈χ|ρ|χ〉
∏
b=0,1
Mb!
nb,0!nb,1!
(8)
The technique used [12] for problems involving i.i.d.
quantum sources is also useful here, although in our case
the state ρ may be highly correlated. The Hilbert space
for the M qubits, H⊗M , can be decomposed as H⊗M ∼=⊕
λ Uλ ⊗ Vλ such that any operator of form U⊗M with
U ∈ SU(2) is decomposed as U⊗M ∼=⊕λ πλ(U)⊗1, and
any unitary operator Sp corresponding to permutation
p ∈ SM is decomposed as Sp ∼=
⊕
λ 1 ⊗ π˜λ(p). Here
the maps πλ and π˜λ are irreducible representations of
SU(2) and SM , respectively. The index λ runs over all
Young diagrams with two rows and M boxes, namely,
λ = (M − k, k) with k = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊M/2⌋. We will thus
use k instead of λ below. For later use, we derive a
convenient form of the projection Pk onto Uk ⊗ Vk. Let
us parameterize the pure states of a qubit as |n〉, using
the unit vector n in the Bloch sphere. Define a state on
H⊗M as |k,n〉 ≡ |Ψ〉⊗k|n〉⊗M−2k, where |Ψ〉 is the singlet
state (|0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉)/√2 of two qubits. The state |k,n〉
is contained in subspace Uk ⊗ Vk. Consider the operator
with unit trace
1
4πM !
∑
p
∫
dnSp|k,n〉〈k,n|S†p. (9)
Since it commutes with any Sp and any U ∈ SU(2), it
should be equal to (dUk d
V
k )
−1Pk, where d
U
k ≡ dimUk and
dVk ≡ dimVk.
Since ρ commutes with any Sp, it can be decomposed
as ρ ∼=⊕k(pk/dVk )ρk⊗1, where∑ pk = 1 and Trρk = 1.
Then, 〈χ|ρ|χ〉 ≤ ∑k(pk/dVk )〈χ|Pk|χ〉. Substituting the
form of (9) to Pk, we have
〈χ|ρ|χ〉 ≤ max
k,n
dUk
M !
∑
p
|〈χ|Sp|k,n〉|2 (10)
Recall that |χ〉 takes the form of |χ〉 = ⊗ν |ν〉⊗nν ,
where ν represents the double index (b, j). Then,
|〈χ|Sp|k,n〉|2 becomes the product of (Sνν′)sνν′ and
(Tν)
tν , where Sνν′ ≡ |〈ν|〈ν′||Ψ〉|2 and Tν ≡ |〈ν|n〉|2. The
numbers sνν′ and tν depend on the permutation p. Let
µ({sνν′}, {tν}) be the number of different permutations
that give the same values of {sνν′}, {tν}. Explicitly, this
degeneracy factor is given by
µ =
(∏
ν
nν !
)
k!∏
ν,ν′ sνν′ !
(M − 2k)!∏
ν tν !
(11)
Using this factor, the summation over p can be replaced
by the summation over {sνν′}, {tν}, which take at most
poly(M) values. Since dUk = M − 2k+1 is also poly(M),
we obtain
〈χ|ρ|χ〉 ≤ poly(M) max
k,n,{sνν′},{tν}
µ
M !
∏
ν,ν′
(Sνν′)
sνν′
∏
ν
(Tν)
tν
(12)
Combining the Eqs. (8), (11), and (12), and
replacing the factorials by the entropy function
H(pi) ≡ −
∑
i pi log pi using the formula poly(N)
−1 ≤
exp[−NH(pi)]N !/
∏
(Npi)! ≤ 1, we can cast the upper
bound into the form p(δ0, δ1) ≤ poly(M) exp[−M minR],
where the exponent R is given by
R = H(Mb/M) + (k/M)[D(sνν′/k|Sνν′/4)− 2]
+(1− 2k/M)[D(tν/(M − 2k)|Tν/2)− 1], (13)
where D is the relative entropy defined by D(pi|qi) =∑
i pi log2(pi/qi). The empirical probability pbj ≡
tν/(M − 2k) appearing here can be regarded as a joint
probability over the two variables b and j, and we can
consider its marginal probability pj ≡ p0j + p1j and the
conditional probability pb|j ≡ pbj/pj. We use similar
notations for other joint probabilities qbb′jj′ ≡ sνν′/k,
αbj ≡ Tν/2, and βbb′jj′ ≡ Sνν′/4. We further introduce
a variable a, which takes three values {1, 2, 3}, define a
probability ξa by ξ1 = 1 − 2k/M and ξ2 = ξ3 = k/M ,
and define a joint probability γab over a and b, defined
by γ1b = ξ1pb, γ2b = ξ2qb, and γ3b′ = ξ3qb′ . Then, it is a
bit tedious but straightforward to rewrite Eq. (13) as
R = (k/M)[D(qbb′ |qbqb′) +
∑
bb′
qbb′D(qjj′|bb′ |βjj′|bb′)]
+(1− 2k/M)
∑
b
pbD(pj|b|αj|b) +D(γab|γaγb) (14)
where we have used γb = Mb/M , αb = 1/2 and βbb′ =
1/4. Since all terms are nonnegative, R is zero only
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FIG. 1: (a) The optimum value of |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|
2 and the key
generation rate G in the depolarizing channel. (b) The error
rates (normalized by nfil) in the data qubits for the depolar-
izing channel with p = 0.03. The estimated upper bound for
phase errors (dot-dashed), the actual phase errors (solid), and
the bit errors (dotted).
if each pair of probabilities in D are identical. This
implies pbj = |〈b, j|n〉|2(Mb/M), qbj = (1/2)(Mb/M),
and qb′j′ = (1/2)(Mb′/M). From the relation nb,j =
M(ξ1pbj + ξ2qbj + ξ3qb′j′ |b′=b,j′=j) we conclude that, for
min R to be zero, it is necessary that
δb = ξ1|〈b, 1|n〉|2 + (1− ξ1)/2 (15)
for a choice of |n〉 and 0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ 1, or equivalently,
δb = 〈b, 1|σ|b, 1〉 for a state σ of a single qubit. Otherwise,
p(δ0, δ1) is as exponentially small as exp[−M minR].
Note that in the limit of M → ∞, the result is consis-
tent with what is expected from the quantum de Finetti
theorem [13].
Now applying this general result to our case, we have
sin2(θl − θ)− ǫ7 ≤ sin2 φl ≤ sin2(θl + θ) + ǫ8 (16)
for l = 0, 1, where all the angles are defined in [0, π/2] by
the relations n11/(n11+n00) = sin
2 θ0, n01/(n01+n10) =
sin2 θ1, m11/(m11 +m00) = sin
2 φ0, m01/(m01 +m10) =
sin2 φ1, and α
2 = sin2 θ. Together with Eqs. (3)–(7), an
exponentially-reliable upper bound of nph can be found.
In the following, we calculate the final key length in
the limit of large N , by setting all ǫj to be zero. From
Eq. (2), nbit is found to be equal to nerr. Eqs. (3)–(7)
are now linear equations, and together with the relation∑
nij =
∑
mij = N , they can be used to eliminate nij
and mij . Then, the inequalities (16) for l = 0, 1 are
combined to give
|nfil − 2nerr| ≤ Nαβf(x), (17)
where f(x) ≡ √x2 −∆2 +
√
(1 − x)2 − (β2 − α2 −∆)2
with ∆ ≡ (nfil/N − 2α2β2)/(β2−α2) and x ≡ 2nph/N −
(β2−α2)∆. The positivity of nij requires that |∆| ≤ x ≤
1−|β2−α2−∆|. Solving Eq. (17) gives an upper bound
nph of the number of phase errors nph, as a function of
the observed values nerr and nfil.
The achievable length of the final key is given [8, 14] by
nkey = nfil[1−h(nbit/nfil)−h(nph/nfil)], when nph/nfil ≤
1/2 [note that positions of errors are randomized in step
(2)]. Here h(p) ≡ H(p, 1− p). In order to show a quanti-
tative example of the security, we assume that the chan-
nel is the depolarizing channel where the state ρ evolves
as ρ → (1 − p)ρ + p/3∑a=x,y,z σaρσa, where σa is the
Pauli operator of a component. In Fig. 1(a), we plot
the key generation rate G = nkey/N optimized over the
nonorthogonality |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2. It is seen that our proto-
col is secure up to p ∼ 0.034, which is smaller than in
BB84 with one-way EDP (p ∼ 0.165) [5]. In Fig. 1(b),
it can be seen that when |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 becomes smaller, the
estimation of the phase errors becomes poorer. On the
other hand, larger values of |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 make the signal
more vulnerable to the noises, resulting in larger errors.
This trade-off is in contrast to BB84, in which a good es-
timation and small errors are achieved at the same time
by adding two more states in the protocol.
In summary, the B92 protocol can be regarded as an
EDP with a filtering process, and the filtering makes the
phase and bit errors related to each other, which enables
us to estimate the phase errors from the amount of the
bit errors. The estimation scheme involving nonorthog-
onal measurements developed here will also be useful in
practical QKD schemes having lower symmetries due to
imperfections in the apparatus.
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